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SUMMARY 
Market price elasticities of demand for basic telecommunications services depend on a number of 
factors, including: 
• The absolute level of tariffs 
• The level and distribution of incomes 
• The type of service. 
These are market elasticities.  In a competitive market, individual operators will experience 
elasticities which are higher than market elasticities.   
There have been many published studies but most do not refer to developing countries.   This paper, 
originally prepared in 1998 but unpublished until now, presents some of the results which have been 
obtained, summarises them and draws conclusions about what they suggest for the price elasticities 
in developing countries. 
Typical price elasticities found in developed countries are: 
• Rental  -0.1 to -0.6 
• Local Calls  -0.1 to -0.5 
• Long distance calls -0.2 to -0.5   
• International calls  -0.2 to -1.5 
Taking the national income, network penetration and tariff structure into account, developing country 
elasticities are likely to be higher for residential access and local calls, and possibly for other services.
                                                   
1 Former Economic Advisor to the Board of British Telecom 
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1 RESEARCH METHOD AND SOME GENERAL FEATURES OF PRICE 
ELASTICITIES 
1.1 Research method 
This study has been carried out using desk research and some original analytical 
work based on available data.    
1.2 Tariff Change and Revenue Change 
Price elasticity is the ratio of proportionate volume change to proportionate price 
change.  Thus, if a 5% price increase results in a 2% volume decrease, the price 
elasticity of demand (written as e) is: 
                         e = -2/5 = -0.4 
If the price elasticity has a value of -1, the revenue is unchanged by the tariff 
increase because the traffic decreases by the same proportion as the tariff 
increases.  Price elasticities which are less than 1 in absolute value (i.e. 0>e>-1) are 
said to be low, and revenue rises when the tariff increases.  Price elasticities which 
are greater than 1 in absolute value will result in a fall in revenue when the tariff 
increases (and rise when the tariff is reduced).  These are said to be high. 
1.3  Real and Nominal Tariff Change 
Tariffs change in both nominal and real terms.   At the time of a tariff change there 
is an increase of, say, 10% and this is the nominal increase.   During the 
subsequent period, when telecommunications tariffs are unchanged but external 
prices, as measured by a Consumer Price Index, are changing, telecommunications 
tariffs are changing in relative terms.  Thus, if external prices rise by 10% while 
telecommunications tariffs remain unchanged, there is a real tariff fall of 10%.   
Traffic levels are generally taken to respond to real tariff changes, as well as in 
response to a step increase in nominal tariffs.  This is consistent with the 
assumption that consumers are substantially free of monetary illusion (i.e. they 
allow for the effect of inflation in their purchase decisions).  It also gives more data 
points when estimating price elasticities under conditions of inflation. 
1.4 Long and Short Term Elasticities 
The elasticities in 1.2 are short term or point elasticities.  They are usually 
estimated from time series and measure the immediate response to tariff changes.  
Time series analysis may miss longer term effects.  The long term elasticities may 
be higher for several reasons: 
• People take time to adapt life styles to big changes 
• Over the longer period, Companies and Institutions may plan and build private 
networks as an alternative to the PSTN and they may have unexpired contracts 
to fulfil.   
Time series analysis can be adapted to pick up longer term effects.  Another way of 
allowing for them is to estimate elasticities from cross-section studies, in which a 
comparison is made between the tariff/traffic relationships among a group of 
different operators at the same point in time.  Cross-section studies originated in the 
USA, where there are many independent operators to compare.  Allowance has to 
be made for differences in income and other factors which may affect traffic levels, 
as well as tariffs.   
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Cross-section studies have often revealed long term elasticities which are higher 
that those for the short term, especially for long distance and international traffic.  
One is used later in this paper in section 4. The terms ‘long (or short) term’ and ‘long 
(or short) run’ are used interchangeably in this paper. 
1.5 Individual, Market, Own-Price and Cross-elasticities 
There are three types of price elasticity: 
• That for individuals.  Each person has their own demand response to changes 
in price.   This is rarely known precisely. 
• The market elasticity.  This is the price elasticity in the market as a whole, 
where the demands of all the individuals are aggregated into one demand curve.  
Market elasticities are the ones experienced by monopolists. 
• Own-price and cross-elasticities.  Each supplier in the market experiences a 
response to changes in its own prices, which is its own-price elasticity and a 
response to changes in price by its competitors, if it has any.   Monopolists have 
an own-price elasticity which is the same as the market elasticity and there are 
no cross-elasticities because there are no competitors. 
In a competitive situation, own-price elasticities are generally larger than the market 
elasticity because consumers will switch to another supplier if one firm puts its price 
up.  Cross-elasticities are positive, i.e. a firm experiences a traffic increase if a 
competitor raises its prices. 
1.6 Bidirectional Elasticities 
If different tariffs prevail at each end of a call, the traffic originated at one end (say 
Company A) may be affected by a tariff change at the other end (say Company B).   
This can happen: 
• With international calls 
• With domestic trunk calls, if different operators control each end of the call 
• With all domestic calls, if different classes of user, such as business and 
residential, have different call tariffs. 
There are two reasons for the effect: 
• A price cut at the distant end (Company B) may stimulate more outbound traffic 
from Company B, which in turn stimulates more returned calls from Company A 
as a secondary effect, called reciprocal calling. 
• Call reorigination, carried out informally or through resellers e.g. A caller in 
company A makes a brief call to a Company B customer and asks them to ring 
back, because Company B's tariff to Company A is lower than Company A's tariff 
to Company B. 
These effects are a type of cross-elasticity and have been called cross-company 
elasticities by Applebe et al., who estimated them for traffic between different 
companies in Canada and traffic between Canada and the USA.   
The reciprocal calling effect will generally be negative, i.e. a price increase at the 
distant end (company B) will reduce outgoing traffic from both companies.    
The call reorigination (call-back) effect is positive.  A price increase by Company B 
results in less call-back, increasing outward traffic from Company A. 
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Suppose that there is the same proportionate tariff increase at both ends of the 
route and that there is no call-back.  Company A's traffic falls because of its own 
tariff increase and falls further because of the loss of reciprocal traffic caused by 
Company B's increase. The resultant elasticity is called a bidirectional elasticity, 
following Applebe et al. It was found that such elasticities were generally higher 
than those where there was a tariff change at only one end of the route (called uni-
directional in their study). 
1.7 Elasticities Related to Price 
Price elasticity is often related to the price itself, being higher for more expensive 
calls.   Various studies have found this effect, examples being: 
• Price elasticity is lower for local calls than for long distance calls. 
• Price elasticity is higher for inland trunk calls over longer distances, e.g. in 
Canada (Applebe et al.) and Spain (Amaral) 
• Price elasticity is higher for peak rate calls than for cheap rate calls 
• From any one country, price elasticity tends to be higher for the more expensive 
international calls than for the cheaper ones 
• Price elasticity estimates on international routes have tended to fall as 
international call prices have come down. 
1.8  Business and Residential Users 
Business users are often less price-sensitive than residential users, e.g. in the UK.  
There are three factors: 
• Business users are often agents, rather than direct bill-payers.   Their experience 
of the value of the call is more immediate than their experience of the cost. 
• Residential customers usually have less money than businesses, sharpening the 
income effect. 
• The value of calls may be rated higher by businessmen. 
This is a rather speculative area.  For example, the relatively heavy use of 
international calls by businesses reflects the nature of their commercial relationships 
as well as a greater ability to afford international services. 
 
2 PUBLISHED STUDIES AND FINDINGS 
A summary of published studies is given in Annex 1.  They are discussed below. 
2.1 Rental/Access 
Several North American studies have shown that price elasticities among residential 
customers are highest among the youngest and poorest customers and among 
those who have most recently joined the telephone network.  One such is given by 
Bodnar et al. for Canada, based on 1985 Household Income data and relating to 
the take-up of telephone service.   The price elasticities fell from the lowest (1st) 
quintile of income (in Canadian $) to the highest: 
Income     Elasticity     Post-tax income C$  
1st Quintile    -0.026         <12270 
2nd Quintile    -0.012         12270-20169 
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3rd Quintile    -0.006         20170-28339 
4th Quintile    -0.002         28340-38509 
5th Quintile    -0.0005        >38509 
 
All these elasticities are extremely low.  Separate figures show that they were lowest 
in the largest urban centres.  The elasticities relate to an affluent country where 
almost every household already has telephone service. 
An earlier study, carried out by Perl and using US data, showed similar effects but 
higher elasticities.  For households with a twenty-year-old head and income of 
US$1,500, Perl's estimates (given in a summary by Taylor) varied from -0.173 to -
0.422, three or four times the average for all age groups and income levels.  
The Italian study by Cipallone & Gambardella (see Annex 1) shows a price elasticity 
of -0.55 for basic service.   
2.2 Local Calls 
Annex 1 shows that estimates of short term price elasticities are around -0.1 to -0.2 
for business and residential, though there is evidence that the long term elasticity 
may be as high as -0.5. 
2.3 Long Distance Calls 
Long distance calls on residential lines have an average price elasticity of -1.08, 
whereas the average elasticity on business lines is (on one study only) -0.35.  Other 
studies, in which the two types of line were not separated, averaged -0.46. 
There is evidence that elasticity rises with distance, e.g. for residential calls in 
Spain. 
Long run elasticities are often substantially higher than those found in the short 
term.   Bidirectional elasticities are higher than simple (uni-directional) elasticities. 
2.4 International Calls 
The average price elasticity for the studies in Annex 1 is -0.84, within which there is 
a good deal of systematic variation.  The Swedish figures given by Hackl and 
Westlund are averages.  It was found that, over all but one of the six routes from 
Sweden which they studied, price elasticity increased between 1976 and 1991.  The 
exception was the route to the USA, where it decreased.  
Studies of traffic on other routes originating in the USA have also shown a decrease 
in price elasticity.  One reason is likely to be the substantial fall in tariffs which has 
taken place with the development of competition on international services.  This has 
been especially strong on transatlantic routes where traffic volumes are high. 
 2.5 Market Structure 
Price elasticity featured strongly in proposals put to the FCC in the USA for various 
types of discounting schemes, including optional calling plans.  The FCC applied a 
net revenue test, which required that revenue rose after a tariff cut (i.e. high price 
elasticity) before letting the schemes through.  This is consistent with a relatively 
high price elasticity over long distances characteristic of long distance service in the 




3  THE SITUATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Most of the work discussed so far relates to experience in developed countries.  
Much of it has been prompted by North American regulatory requirements where, 
especially in the 1970's and 1980's, the operating companies had limits set to their 
return on capital.  The companies had to present their regulators with estimates of 
the revenue generated by a tariff increase, so that the effect on profitability could be 
calculated, and this required estimates of the elasticity of demand with respect to 
price.    
In the UK, where Post Office Telecommunications had its rate of return tightly 
regulated by the government until the establishment of the RPI-X method of price 
control in 1983, there was also pressure to develop estimates of price elasticity, 
though it was much weaker. 
Research in other countries, like more recent work in North America and the UK, 
has continued to be influenced by regulatory requirements but it is increasingly 
being used by corporate planners to understand price elasticities in competitive 
markets. 
Very little of the work so far published has related to price elasticities in low income 
or developing countries.  There are several reasons for thinking that they may be 
different to those for the developed world.  For example: 
• The balance between incomes and telecommunications costs is different 
• The proportion of business use is likely to be lower in richer countries 
Service quality, including the length of waiting lists, tends to be poorer in poorer 
countries, suggesting a different balance of preference between quality and price. 
3.1 Incomes and Telecommunications Costs 
Telecommunications networks use equipment which is traded on world markets and 
production costs are much the same in countries of all income levels.  Sales prices 
depend on the bargaining position of the operators, including the degree to which 
they have a choice of supplier.  Large operators may be able to negotiate 
favourable terms based on a high volume of purchases.  Smaller operators may 
also be able to do so if the manufacturer sees advantage in selling at a favourable 
price to expand sales, or if the home government of the manufacturer provides a 
subsidy.  Otherwise, they may pay more than the larger operators.   
Some costs may be lower in developing countries.  For example, local labour costs 
may be lower, so that labour-intensive elements of the telecommunications 
infrastructure, such as ducts, may cost less and current account labour costs may 
be lower.  Overall, though, telecommunications service will be relatively expensive 
when compared with average incomes.   The following statistics are calculated from 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) statistics for 1993: 
 
Income Group GDP per Head $ Tels Revenue per 
line $ 
Revenue per line as 
% of GDP per head 
Low 390 399 102 
Lower Middle 1,740 228 13 
Upper Middle 4,145 604 15 




Figures for individual countries are highly variable.  They show that residential 
telephone bills are normally higher in developed countries but they represent a 
lower proportion of average family income. 
An unpublished study, carried out for an African low income country in 1986, 
presented anecdotal evidence that price elasticities were no higher than those in 
Europe: 
'. . indications suggest that the demand from business users for an 
exchange connection is not at all sensitive to installation or rental charges.  
In consequence it can be assumed that the price elasticity of demand for 
exchange connections is approximately zero' 
'. . historical data on the volume of [inland] call units suggests that there was 
a temporary drop in traffic volume immediately after the increases in tariffs in 
1983 and 1985.  The drop in traffic in 1983 was about 5% and lasted only 
one month . . . . The drop recorded in 1985 was about 10% and lasted for 
three months before traffic volume returned to the pre-existing level.' 
'The 1985 tariff changes effectively doubled the price of international calls.  
The measured level of outgoing international traffic in 1985 was 7% below 
the 1984 level.  . . . assuming the underlying growth in demand to be 15% a 
year, a price elasticity of about -0.2 can be inferred for international calls.'        
The higher elasticity for international calls was thought to be due the use of call-
back by business users, who tended to initiate their international calls from the 
country that offered the cheapest rates.   
3.2 The Proportion of Business Users 
Telecommunications networks are usually dominated by business users in the early 
stages of their development.  Later the balance swings towards residential use and 
in mature networks the number of residential lines will be much higher than the 
number of business lines.  Since the calling rate on business lines is much higher 
than that on residential lines, business users may still account for around half of the 
total revenue. 
Price elasticities tend to be lower among business users and this is a factor which 
would tend to reduce the price elasticity experienced with networks in the early 
stages of their development.  The African material quoted above lends support to 
this. 
3.3 Evidence from Service Quality 
Service quality tends to be poorer in the developing countries.  For example, waiting 
lists are often longer.  There is some systematic variation, associated with revenue 
per line and GDP per capita, taken from ITU statistics for 1993, as above: 




Low 399               2.5                         
Lower Middle        228               4.7  
Upper Middle        604               2.8 




The data suggests a greater price sensitivity towards paying for service 
improvements where revenue per line is low.  This could reflect a shortage of 
investment capital as well as a direct effect of lower income.  It would be consistent 
with a greater price elasticity for basic telecommunications services. 
4 AN INTERNATIONAL CROSS-SECTION STUDY 
In view of the paucity of direct data about price elasticities in developing countries, a 
cross-sectional study was carried out for a group of 40 of the 55 countries which 
were classified as 'Low Income' in the ITU statistics for 1993.  The study used as its 
starting point the well-known relationship between line per 100 population and GDP 
per head in US$.  Although the association is clear when viewed over the entire 
range of world income, there is a good deal of scatter for the low-income countries 
on their own.  It was thought that some of this scatter might be due to differences in 
the tariff level.    
4.1 Method 
After a few trials it was found that the cost of: 
     Monthly Rental + 50 Local Calls = Monthly bill 
explained a significant part of the variation, and provided a better fit than monthly 
rental on its own. 
The full model used to estimate the relationships is: 
     Y = AGiBj     where    
 Y = Lines per 100 inhabitants 
     G = GDP per inhabitant in US$ 
   B = Monthly bill in US$ 
This was put into logarithmic form as: 
     Log(Y) = A + i x Log(G) + j x Log(B) 
to estimate A, i and j. 
With this formulation: 
     i is the elasticity of demand with respect to income 
     j is the elasticity of demand with respect to price 
There were 40 countries for which values of all the variables were available from the 
ITU statistics.   These are detailed in Annex 2. 
4.2  Results 
The estimates of the income elasticity i and j were both significant, being: 
     i = income elasticity = 0.75 (standard error 0.20)  
     j = price elasticity  = -0.66 (standard error 0.15) 
The income elasticity is the proportionate response of Lines per 100 Inhabitants to 
changes in GDP per Inhabitant.  The standard error is a measure of the accuracy of 
the estimates.  Both estimates are over three times greater than their standard 
errors, giving well over 95% confidence that the true elasticities were significantly 
different from zero. 
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The income elasticity is in line with expectations in developed countries, and higher 
than that found where penetration levels are very high. 
The price elasticity j, at -0.66, is a good deal higher than most estimates of the price 
elasticity for access and local calls which are found in the studies for developed 
countries.  This is strong confirmation of the suggestion, found in some of the 
studies, than the elasticity rises as income falls. 
Chart 1 shows the fitted relationship between the logarithms of Lines per 100 
Inhabitants and GDP per Inhabitant.  The 'predicted' line on the chart shows the 
trend indicated by the elasticity coefficient.  For example, the level of penetration in 
Sri Lanka is a little higher than the predicted figure (+0.1) in logarithmic terms.  The 
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Chart 2 plots the residual errors in Chart 1 (i.e. the differences between the actual 
points and the trend line, using their original values) against the logarithm of the 
monthly bill for Residential Rental plus 50 Local Calls.  This illustrates the 
association between the residual errors and the tariff level.  High positive residuals 
(i.e. penetration levels higher than those predicted by the income elasticity, such as 
for Mozambique) are associated with low tariffs.  The fitted trend line is also shown.   
Most of the countries had the same rental tariff for business and residential lines.  
The exceptions made little difference to the result.  Two other variables which might 
have a bearing on penetration are: 
Waiting List as % of system size 
Rental/(GDP per head) 
No work has been done with these but their values are given in Annex 3. 
The Effect of Operational Constraints on Estimates 
Operational constraints may prevent a full response of traffic changes to tariff 
changes.  Waiting Lists are an example.  A lower tariff may result in a longer waiting 
list rather than a larger system size if new connections cannot be supplied.  Short 
term measurements of price elasticity will then be biased downwards. Network 
Congestion may also damp down the response of traffic growth to tariff change. 
5 CONCLUSION  
In the light of this evidence and the need for further analysis, this paper contributes 
to the toolbox for promoting telecom affordability by outlining the data requirements 
for national studies of price elasticities.  These would include: 
Economic Data 
Consumer Price Index            Monthly if possible 
Gross Domestic Product volume   Quarterly if possible 
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Population                      Annual if possible 
Age distribution                Annual if possible 
Regional distribution 
Households 
Number of households            Annual if possible 
Customer Data 
Number of business customers, analysed by business sector if possible 
Number of residential customers, with some regional and other analysis 
Tariffs 
Tariffs for all exchange line and call types, monthly 
Business Volumes 
The number of business exchange lines, monthly if possible 
The number of residential exchange lines, monthly if possible 
The number of calls and/or call minutes for each type of call and each international 
tariff group, monthly if possible. 
 
Comment: This list presents an ideal.  It may be possible to work with less.  The 
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ANNEX 1 PRICE ELASTICITY STUDIES 
Rental/Access 
Reference  Date Elasticity type Country Elasticity 
Cipallone/Gambardella 1993 Basic Service Italy -0.55 
 
Local Business Calls 
Reference  Date Elasticity type Country Elasticity 
Amaral et al. 1995 Short term Spain -0.19 
  Long term  -0.17 
     
Average               -0.18 
 
All Local Calls  
Reference  Date Elasticity type Country Elasticity 
Cracknell        1994 Short term  UK 1946-75  -0.17 
  Long term UK 1946-75  -0.47 
Davis et al.          1973  USA -0.21 
Turner (unpublished)    UK -0.06 
     
Average    -0.22 
 
Long-distance Residential Calls 
Reference  Date Elasticity type Country Elasticity 
Dobell et al. 1972 Short run Ontario & Quebec, -0.3 
  Long run Canada -1.9 
Khadem 1973 Short run Trans-Canada -1.28 
  Long run Trans-Canada -2.58 
Larsen & McCleary  1972 Long run USA -1.01 
Perez 1993 Short haul Spain -0.15 
  Medium haul  -0.33 
  Long haul  -1.18 
Rash 1972 Long run Ontario & Quebec, 
Canada 
-0.94 
Waverman 1974 Residential revenue 
per phone long run 
Canada -1.16 
     
Average                                                         -1.08 
 
Long-distance Business and Residential Calls 
Reference  Date Elasticity type Country Elasticity 
Appelbe et al.        1988 Full-Rate Uni-directional Canada -0.21 to -0.48 
  Full-Rate Bi-directional  -0.36 to -0.73 
  Discount Rate Uni-
directional 
 -0.39 to -0.49 
  Discount Rate Bi-
directional 
 -0.59 to -0.75  
Deschamps     1974 Trunk Belgium -0.24 
Gatto et al.       1988 Long run USA -0.72 
GPO CSD Report 41     1965 Full rate trunk      UK -0.52 
GPO SBRD Report 2    1968 Cheap rate trunk     UK -0.77 
GPO SBRD Report 12   1971 All trunk            UK -0.17 
GPO SBRD Report 27   1973 All trunk            UK -0.18 
GPO SBRD Report 73  1976 Cheap rate trunk     UK -0.096 
GPO SBRD Report 89   1977 Full rate trunk      UK -0.114 
Iacono et al.         1990  Ontario & 
Quebec, 
Canada 
-0.45                    
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Larsen & McCleary     1972 Long run USA -0.98 




  Trunk per phone, short run Sweden -0.29 
  Trunk per phone, long run  -0.58 
  Trunk per phone, short run UK -0.41 
  Trunk per phone, long run  -0.72 
     
Average    -0.46 
  
Long-distance Business Calls 
Reference  Date Elasticity type Country Elasticity 
Amaral et al. 1995 Short term Spain -0.34 
  Long term  -0.36 
     
Average               -0.35 
 
International Calls 
Reference  Date Elasticity type Country Elasticity 
Amaral et al. 1995 Short run Spain -0.17 
Appelbe et al.        1988 Full-Rate Uni-
directional 
Canada-USA -0.43 to -0.49 
  Discount Rate Uni-
directional 
 -0.45 to -0.53 
Berstein et al 1977 International Canada -1.391 
BT CPRD 1979 Short run              UK-France -0.211 
BT CPRD 1979 Long run UK-France -0.378 
BT CPRD 1979  UK-New Zealand -0.816 
BT CPRD 1979  UK-USA -0.936 
Craver & Neckowitz 1979  UK-USA -0.515 
 1979 Minutes UK-USA -0.325 
Drew 1973 Calls and letters UK -0.86 
Hackl & Westlund      1995 Short run Sweden-Denmark -0.598 
  Long run  -0.975 
  Short run Sweden-Finland -0.302 
  Long run  -0.627 
  Short run Sweden-Germany -0.258 
  Long run  -0.369 
  Short run Sweden-Norway -0.509 
  Long run  -1.178 
  Short run Sweden-UK -0.992 
  Long run  -0.978 
  Short run Sweden-USA -0.122 
  Long run  -0.961 
Khadem 1977 Short run Canada -1 
  Long run  -1.5 
Kwok, Lee & Pearce    1975 Short run  -1.7 
  Long run  -2.71 
Lago 1970  International -1.25 
Nace 1974  Japan -2.28 
GPO SBRD Report 
28 
1973  UK -0.117 
Yatrakis 1972  46 nations in 1967 -1.03 
     
Average               -0.84 
 
Note: References in this annex are from summaries by Littlechild, Taylor and Beesley and 
papers by the named authors. 
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ANNEX 2 DATA USED IN THE ANALYSIS 
 








Res rental + 
50 calls $ 
Bangladesh 0.23 199.7 3.8 0.04 5.8 
Benin 0.39 423.1 8.6 0.21 19.1 
Bhutan 0.25 200.0 42.6 0.03 44.1 
Burkina Faso 0.22 295.9 6.1 0.21 16.6 
Burundi 0.26 183.3 1.9 0.06 4.9 
Chad 0.08 213.1 2.0 0.35 19.5 
Comoros 0.80 600.0 6.6 0.26 19.6 
Egypt 4.27 603.2 1.1 0.02 2.1 
Gambia 1.63 400.0 3.5 0.10 8.5 
Ghana 0.30 423.3 1.6 0.16 9.6 
Guinea 0.18 460.3 1.9 0.09 6.4 
Guinea-Bissau 0.86 200.0 3.0 0.17 11.5 
Honduras 2.09 589.3 3.3 0.01 3.8 
Indonesia 0.92 675.2 3.6 0.05 6.1 
Lao PDR 0.19 266.7 5.7 0.28 19.7 
Lesotho 0.55 368.4 5.3 0.03 6.8 
Madagascar 0.27 236.2 3.7 0.06 6.7 
Malawi 0.35 204.3 5.7 0.05 8.2 
Maldives 5.00 1000.0 2.7 0.05 5.2 
Mali 0.15 304.3 4.8 0.25 17.3 
Mauritania 0.36 571.4 10.7 0.12 16.7 
Mozambique 0.37 76.9 4.5 0.04 6.5 
Myanmar 0.18 845.6 7.2 0.05 9.7 
Nepal 0.35 137.3 3.1 0.10 8.1 
Nicaragua 1.67 450.0 2.2 0.01 2.7 
Niger 0.13 273.8 6.8 0.21 17.3 
Nigeria 0.31 291.7 2.9 0.08 6.9 
Pakistan 1.31 337.1 2.0 0.07 5.5 
S Tome & Principe 2.40 400.0 2.1 0.03 3.6 
Sierra Leone 0.32 155.6 1.9 0.08 5.9 
Sri Lanka 0.90 500.0 1.7 0.03 3.2 
Sudan 0.23 157.5 3.3 0.11 8.8 
Tajikistan 4.55 543.9 0.5 0.00 0.5 
Tanzania 0.32 101.1 4.9 0.03 6.4 
Togo 0.43 400.0 5.1 0.18 14.1 
Uganda 0.12 183.3 0.7 0.04 2.7 
Vietnam 0.37 139.6 9.4 0.11 14.9 
Yemen 1.21 768.7 4.2 0.02 5.2 
Zambia 0.92 423.5 0.5 0.14 7.5 
Zimbabwe 1.21 471.7 1.7 0.03 3.2 
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ANNEX 3 ADDITIONAL DATA  
Country Waiting list as % of system 
size 
Res rental as % of 
GDP/cap 
Afghanistan 431.0 0.0 
Bangladesh 48.9 22.8 
Benin 36.3 24.4 
Bhutan  255.6 
Burkina Faso  24.7 
Burundi 32.1 12.4 
Cambodia 118.6 5.2 
Chad 41.3 11.3 
China 9.4 0.0 
Comoros 30.0 13.2 
Egypt 53.7 2.2 
Ethiopia 106.4 22.8 
Gambia 57.7 10.5 
Ghana 19.9 4.5 
Guinea  5.0 
Guinea-Bissau 8.1 18.0 
Guyana 56.1 1.0 
Haiti 50.7 0.0 
Honduras 46.7 6.7 
India 31.1 0.0 
Indonesia 6.9 6.4 
Kenya 41.0 0.0 
Lao PDR 14.0 25.7 
Lesotho 77.1 17.3 
Madagascar 21.8 18.8 
Malawi 88.7 33.5 
Maldives 12.0 3.2 
Mali  18.9 
Mauritania 55.3 22.5 
Mozambique 34.3 70.2 
Myanmar  10.2 
Nepal 143.5 27.1 
Nicaragua 42.1 5.9 
Niger 12.4 29.8 
Nigeria 75.0 11.9 
Pakistan 46.3 7.1 
Rwanda 42.4 0.0 
S Tom‚ & Principe 20.8 6.3 
Sierra Leone 31.7 14.7 
Sri Lanka 78.6 4.1 
Sudan 42.8 25.1 
Tajikistan 29.5 1.1 
Tanzania 167.6 58.1 
Togo 10.4 15.3 
Uganda 12.5 4.6 
Vietnam 57.7 80.8 
Yemen 60.5 6.6 
Zambia 87.9 1.4 
Zimbabwe 77.8 4.3 
 
 
